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Abstract
In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining
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1 Introduction
Rubinstein (1982) proved the existence of a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium (SPE) in bilateral bargaining under complete information. This
uniqueness property of SPE is lost when extending the model to bilateral
bargaining under incomplete information or n-person bargaining under com-
plete information1(n ≥ 3). However, as pointed out in Sutton (1986), when
restricting attention to stationary strategies or strategies that depends con-
tinuously on history, there will still be a unique SPE (Herrero (1985), and
Binmore (1985)). That is, we have a unique stationary SPE outcome, which
is also the unique SPE in the space of continuous strategies for multilateral
bargaining with complete information. Furthermore, this unique station-
ary SPE outcome is the limit of the unique outcome in the finite period
truncation game as T →∞.
However, it is not clear how to characterize this unique stationary out-
come in a close form for agents with heterogeneous discount factors due to
the inability to track agents’payoffs in the dynamic setting. A closed form
characterization of the this outcome might have meaningful benefits in the
literature for two reasons. First, it would allow us to do comparative statics
with ease. Second, it will provide a reduced form for applications of the
multilateral bargaining model to real world problems.
The purpose of this paper is to characterize a closed form solution for
the unique stationary SPE in the multilateral bargaining model with het-
1For example, as shpwn in Sutton (1986), for 3-person bargainging problem with
complete information and homogeneous discount factor δ,any division x = (x1, x2, x3) in
the simplex can be supported by a SPE when the discount factor δ > 1
2
.
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erogeneous discount factors.
It should be noted that attempts has been made to generalize the bilat-
eral model to multilateral settings with complete information by Dutta and
Gevers (1984) as illustrated in Moulin (1986) and Sutton (1986). However,
players in their setup are assumed to have identical discount factor due to
the tractability problem.
The multiplicity of SPE is illustrated nicely in Sutton (1986), together
with very insightful summary about the potential diffi culties along the line
of incomplete information or multi-person bargaining. And this is further
demonstrated in Cai (2000) . Since the procedure of subgame perfection no
longer has the teeth to bite down the multiplicity of equilibria. It might
be an interesting problem to characterize the unique stationary outcome in
closed form.
In this paper, we study infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with al-
ternate offers, denoted G∞, under complete information. We truncate G∞
after finite period T with some disagreement payoff x which is imposed if no
agreement is reached at the ending time T. Denoting this truncated game
by GT (x) .
We first characterize the SPE payoff of GT (x). Then we prove that the
SPE
(
GT (x)
)
converges to the unique stationary SPE outcome as T → ∞,
independent of the termination payoffof x.We further prove that the unique
stationary SPE outcome corresponds to a unique fixed point of a column
stochastic matrix which we call the bargaining operator B. This bargaining
operator is constructed using agents’ discount factors. Applying matrix
theory allows us to calculate unique fixed point in its closed form. The
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share of a player in G∞ depends on one of the principle minors and the first
order derivative of the characteristic polynomial of the bargaining operator,
B.
Another problem in bargaining pointed out by Sutton (1986) is the exis-
tence of first mover advantage, where the player who moves first will obtain
a larger share of the pie in the SPE outcome. it was suggested to randomize
who moves first. In the extension we consider a more general set up by
considering a randomization in each period by assuming the order of moves
in each period follow a stationary Markov chain with some transition matrix
P . We can extend our approach to this setting, and characterize the unique
stationary SPE outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model of multilateral bargaining. We define the bargaining operator for each
player, and link it to a homogeneous Markov chain using individual bargain-
ing operators. It is shown to be irreducible, thus there is a unique invariant
measure corresponding to the stationary outcome of the game G∞ . In Sec-
tion 3 we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium for the multilateral
bargaining model. We show that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium for
the finite horizon case can be written using the bargaining operator that we
introduced in Section 2. In the infinite horizon case the unique stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is simply the fixed point of the bar-
gaining operator. Section 4 illustrates the results with two examples, trilat-
eral bargaining and multilateral bargaining with identical discount factors.
Section 5 provides a closed-form characterization of the bargaining outcome
for the general multilateral bargaining with heterogeneous discount factors.
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Section 6 generalizes the results to multi-person bargaining with random
order of moves where the right to make an offer follows a Markov chain.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Multilateral Model of Bargaining
The purpose of this section is to generalize Rubinstein’s 2-person bargaining
equilibrium to the n-person case with heterogeneous discount factors.
2.1 Description of the Game
Following Rubinstein 1982, we focus on the subgame perfect equilibrium
with complete information.
There is a unit of surplus to be shared among a set of n individuals.
Time t runs from 0, 1, 2, ..., T, ... where T ∈ N.
Starting from player 1, the players take turns offering a plan x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) about
how the pie is shared. Player imakes an offer at dates ti = {t|t = (i− 1) (mod n)}.
Once the offer is accepted by all, the pie is shared accordingly. If the offer
from player i is rejected by any of the other players, the game goes to the
next date and it is player (i + 1)′s turn to make an offer. The individual
discount factor is δi for player i.
To characterize the equilibrium outcome in GT and G∞, we shall use the
theory of stochastic matrices to help us write out the closed form solution
of the stationary equilibrium outcome. This particular matrix, which we
call the bargaining operator, is defined next.
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2.2 The Bargaining Operator
We need at first to introduce the concept of stochastic matrix which plays
central role in characterizing the unique equilibrium outcome in a closed
form. Note that a column stochastic matrix is a matrix whose elements are
nonnegative and the sum of elements in each column equals to 1.
Let ∆n = {x = (x1, ....xn)| xi ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1} be the n- simplex.
Thus ∆n is the set of feasible divisions of the pie in the n-person bargaining
problem.
Each stochastic matrix leaves∆n = {x ∈ Rn|xi ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1} invariant,
thus has fixed points in ∆n. When the matrix is positive, there will be
a unique fixed point. We refer readers to the appendix for the related
definitions and results.
Given player i’s discount factor δi, i=1,...,n, let
Bi =

δ1 0 ... 0 0 0 ... 0
0 δ2 ... 0 0 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1− δ1 1− δ2 ... 1− δi−1 1 1− δi+1 ... 1− δn
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
0 0 ... 0 0 0 ... δn
 =
[
b
(i)
kl
]
n×n
be the individual bargaining operator for player i, which is a matrix with
the diagonal elements bjj = δj , for j 6= i, the ith row bij = 1− δj , for j 6= i,
and bii = 1. And
B = B1B2...Bn
is the bargaining operator for the game, i.e., the composite of those
individual B’s.
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The next proposition describes properties of the above bargaining oper-
ator which is important to pin down the unique stationary SPE outcome.
Proposition 1 i) Each of the individual bargaining operators Bi is a col-
umn stochastic operator which leaves ∆n invariant.
ii) B = B1B2...Bn is a positive stochastic operator .
iii) The fixed point of B in ∆n, x∗, is unique, and furthermore x∗ =
limk→∞B
kxT for any initial condition of the backward induction xT ∈ ∆n.
+
Proof. i) Simple observation shows
∑
k b
(i)
kl = 1. ∀ x ∈ ∆n,
∑
k (Bix)k =∑
k
(∑
l b
(i)
kl xl
)
=
∑
l
(∑
k b
(i)
kl
)
xl =
∑
l xl = 1. Combining with nonnega-
tivity of Bi, we have that Bi leaves ∆n invariant, for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
ii) It is easy to see that the (i, j)th element of B is
bij =
∑
hn−1
...
∑
h2
∑
h1
b
(1)
ih1
b
(2)
h1h2
....b
(n)
hn−1j
> b
(1)
ij b
(2)
jj ....b
(n)
jj
= (1− δj)δj ...1....δj
=
{
δn−2j (1− δj) > 0 i 6= j
δn−1j > 0 i = j
Therefore B is a positive operator.
Clearly B is a column stochastic operator because each of the factors
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Bi is column stochastic.
∑
i
bij =
∑
i
∑
hn−1
...
∑
h2
∑
h1
b
(1)
ih1
b
(2)
h1h2
....b
(n)
hn−1j

=
∑
hn−1
...
∑
h2
∑
h1
(∑
i
b
(1)
ih1
)
b
(2)
h1h2
....b
(n)
hn−1j
=
∑
hn−1
...
∑
h2
∑
h1
b
(2)
h1h2
 ....b(n)hn−1j
= ....
=
∑
hn−1
b
(n)
hn−1j
= 1.
iii) We have shown that B is a positive stochastic operator which is
obviously a primitive. This implies that B is irreducible. Therefore, B has
a unique fixed point in the simplex ∆n, which corresponds to the unique
eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue 1 (please see appendix
for relevant definitions).
3 Characterization of Stationary Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium Outcome
Given the results obtained in the last section, we are now ready to charac-
terize the equilibrium outcome for the multilateral bargaining game.
3.1 The Finite Horizon Case
We first characterize the finite horizon bargaining equilibrium.
The finite horizon game GT
(
xT
)
is the finite truncation of the ∞ −
horizon game. In this finite truncation, players make alternate offers until
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one offer is accepted by everybody. However, if no agreement is reached
before or at T , then an exogenous division xT is imposed on the players.
The following proposition shows that there is a subgame perfect outcome
in the finite horizon bargaining game, and it can be written in a closed form
using the bargaining operators.
Proposition 2 i) If x is an acceptable offer made by player i in period t,
then x′ = Bi−1x is an acceptable offer made by player (i−1) in period (t−1),
(with the understanding that player 0 is player n).
ii) GT
(
xT
)
has a unique SPE outcome
x∗ = B[
T
n
]B1B2...Bl−1x
T ,
where T = l(mod(n)), and [Tn ] is the integer part of
T
n .
Proof. i) It is clear that if player i′s offer x is acceptable to all players,
then [Bi−1x]j is indifferent from xj for j 6= i − 1, and for j = i − 1, we
have that [Bi−1x]i−1 strictly preferable to xi−1. Therefore x′ = Bi−1x is
acceptable to all players.
ii) Since xT is the only acceptable offer to all players in the last period,
backward induction implies that the only acceptable offer in period T − 1
is Bl−1xT . By induction, it is easily shown that x∗ = B[
T
n
]B1B2...Bl−1x
T is
the only acceptable offer in the first period. Thus there is only one subgame
perfect equilibrium with the given payoff.
3.2 The Infinite Horizon Case
In this section we aim to fully characterize the effi cient subgame perfect
equilibrium in the game G∞.
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The following proposition shows that for the multilateral bargaining
model there is only one agreement outcome in ∆n that could be supported
as the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for G∞.
Proposition 3 i) There is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome x∗ ∈ ∆n
for G∞, which is a fixed point for B = B1 · · ·Bn in ∆n .
iii) For any x0 ∈ ∆n, the sequence xk = Bkx0 converges to the unique
stationary bargaining outcome x∗. Hence it is the unique limiting point for
SPE payoff in GT (x), for all x.
Proof. Consider a subgame G∞1 , which is the subgame starting in period
t = n, with player 1 making the offer again. It should be noted that this
game is isomorphic to the original game. Therefore the set of agreements
that could be supported as a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium should
be identical for G∞ and G∞1 . That is, EG∞ = EG∞1 ⊂ ∆. Let G
∞
k be the
subgame starting in period t = kn with player 1 making the offer. Then
G∞k is isomorphic to G
∞, and E = EG∞ = EG∞k ⊂ ∆, for k = 1, 2, ... .
On the other hand, subgame perfection tells us that x′ ∈ EG∞ is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium outcome if and only if there is a subgame perfect
outcome x ∈ EG1 such that x′ = Bx. This implies that E = B(E) = ... =
Bk(E), for k = 1, 2, ... .
Since B is an irreducible stochastic operator, B has a unique fixed point
x∗ in ∆n, and furthermore x∗ = lim
k→∞
Bkx0 for any x0 ∈ ∆n. Therefore
E = {x∗} = lim
k→∞
Bk (∆n) .
Note that the above result illustrates what agreement in ∆n can be
supported as the stationary subgame perfect perfect equilibrium. However,
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it should be noted that when n ≥ 3, the set of SPE outcome can be very
large(see footnote 1). The above proposition tells us the only SPE outcome
in G∞ that can be approached by SPE outcome of GT is the fixed point of
the bargaining operator B.
4 Two Examples
In this section we illustrate the results that we obtained with two examples.
4.1 Example 1: Trilateral Bargaining
Let δ1, δ2, δ3 be the discount factors of the three players, respectively. We
have the following bargaining operator for each of them:
B1 =
1 1− δ2 1− δ30 δ2 0
0 0 δ3
 , B2 =
 δ1 0 01− δ1 1 1− δ3
0 0 δ3
 , B3 =
 δ1 0 00 δ2 0
1− δ1 1− δ2 1
 .
And B = B1B2B3 is the bargaining operator for the trilateral game. This
operator has a unique fixed point in ∆3 (the eigenvector associated with the
largest eigenvalue 1 of B), which is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome:
x∗1x∗2
x∗3
 =

(1−δ2)(1−δ3)(1+δ3+δ2δ3)
(1−δ1δ2δ3)2+δ1δ3(δ2−δ3)+δ1δ2(δ3−δ1)+δ2δ3(δ1−δ2)
δ2(1−δ1)(1−δ3)(1+δ1+δ1δ3)
(1−δ1δ2δ3)2+δ1δ3(δ2−δ3)+δ1δ2(δ3−δ1)+δ2δ3(δ1−δ2)
δ23(1−δ1)(1−δ2)(1+δ2+δ1δ2)
(1−δ1δ2δ3)2+δ1δ3(δ2−δ3)+δ1δ2(δ3−δ1)+δ2δ3(δ1−δ2)
 .
When the three players have the same discount factor δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ,
we have
B =
1− δ + δ3 1− δ 1− δδ(1− δ) δ (1− δ + δ2) δ (1− δ)
δ2 (1− δ) δ2 (1− δ) δ2
 .
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And the equilibrium outcome in this case is simplified tox∗1x∗2
x∗3
 =

1
1+δ+δ2
δ
1+δ+δ2
δ2
1+δ+δ2
 .
4.2 Example 2: N-person Bargaining with Identical Dis-
count Factor
Now we illustrate one more example where the n players have identical
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) . In this case the bargaining operator for player i
is
Bi =

δ 0 ... 0 0 0 ... 0
0 δ ... 0 0 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1− δ 1− δ ... 1− δ 1 1− δ ... 1− δ
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
0 0 ... 0 0 0 ... δ
 , i = 1, 2, ..., n.
And the bargaining operator for the game is
B = B1B2...Bn
=

1− δ + δn 1− δ 1− δ ... 1− δ 1− δ
δ − δ2 δ − δ2 + δn δ − δ2 ... δ − δ2 δ − δ2
δ2 − δ3 δ2 − δ3 δ2 − δ3 + δn ... δ2 − δ3 δ2 − δ3
... ... ... ... ... ...
δn−2 − δn−1 δn−2 − δn−1 δn−2 − δn−1 ... δn−2 − δn−1 + δn δn−2 − δn−1
δn−1 − δn δn−1 − δn δn−1 − δn ... δn−1 − δn δn−1
 .
This is a positive (column) stochastic matrix that has a unique fixed point
in ∆n. This fixed point is the only subgame perfect equilibrium for the game
G∞:
x∗ =
(
(1− δ)
1− δn ,
δ(1− δ)
1− δn ,
δ2(1− δ)
1− δn , · · ·,
δn−1(1− δ)
1− δn
)
.
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5 A Closed-form Characterization for the Station-
ary SPE payoffs
In this section we provide a closed-form representation for the stationary
n-person bargaining outcome.
The following lemma is well-known in matrix theory (see Lancaster and
Tismenetsky, 1985, p.548):
Lemma 1 If B is a stochastic matrix, then lim
n→∞
Bn exists if and only if B
is primitive. In this case, lim
n→∞
Bn = A(1)
c(1)(1)
, where A (λ) = adj (λI −B) , the
adjoint matrix for (λI −B) , and c (λ) = det (λI −B) is the characteristic
polynomial for B, and c(1) (1) is the first-order derivative evaluated at λ = 1.
Partition the bargaining operator for player k as Bk =
(
b
(k)
ij
)
n×n
=[
B
(k)
11 B
(k)
12
B
(k)
21 B
(k)
22
]
, where B(k)11 is a scalar matrix and B
(k)
22 is (n− 1) × (n− 1).
And the bargaining operator for the game, B = B1B2...Bn, is partitioned
accordingly, B = (bij)n×n =
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
]
.
We define the following share function S (δ2, δ3, ..., δn) = det (I −B22) .
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 S(δ2, δ3, ..., δn) = det (I −B22) = det(I− B(1)22 B
(2)
22 ...B
(n)
22 ) is
a polynomial function of (δ2, δ3, ..., δn) , independent of player 1’s discount
factor δ1.
Proof. Given the partition Bk =
(
b
(k)
ij
)
n×n
=
[
B
(k)
11 B
(k)
12
B
(k)
21 B
(k)
22
]
, for k =
2, ..., n, we have B(k)12 = 0. This implies the (2, 2) block for B, B22 =
B
(1)
22 B
(2)
22 ...B
(n)
22 . None of the factors in this matrix product depends on δ1.
Therefore det (I −B22) is a polynomial with variables (δ2, δ3, ..., δn) .
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Let Sk
(
δ1, .., δ̂k, ..., δn
)
= S (δk+1, ..., δn, δ1, ..., δk−1) be the polynomial
function obtained by rotating the variables. It is a polynomial function of
(n− 1) variables (δ1, ..., δk−1, δk+1, ..., δn) .
Now we are ready to state the following closed-form solution for the
n-person bargaining problem.
Proposition 4 In the unique stationary bargaining outcome x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) ,
the share for player k can be represented as x∗k =
δk−1k Sk(δ1,..δ̂k,...,δn)
c(1)(1)
, where
Sk(δ1, ..., δ̂k, ..., δn) = S(δk+1, .., δn, δ1, ..., δk−1) = det
(
I −B(k)22 ...B
(n)
22 B
(1)
22 ...B
(k−1)
22
)
is defined as above.
Proof. From Lemma 2 we know that lim
n→∞
Bn = A(1)
c(1)(1)
, and B A(1)
c(1)(1)
=
lim
n→∞
Bn+1 = A(1)
c(1)(1)
. Therefore each non-zero column of A(1)
c(1)(1)
must be an
eigenvector of B associated with the unitary eigenvalue. That is, each
nonzero column of A(1)
c(1)(1)
must be equal to the bargaining outcome since B
is a primitive matrix and the unitary eigenvalue is a simple root.
Next we examine the (1, 1) element of the matrix A(1)
c(1)(1)
, which is det(I−B22)
c(1)(1)
,
where B22 is the (n− 1)× (n− 1) block in the bargaining matrix B. Since
B22 = B
(1)
22 B
(2)
22 ...B
(n)
22 , each of B
(2)
22 , ..., B
(n)
22 is a (n− 1) × (n− 1) stochas-
tic matrix, and B(1)22 = diag (δ2, δ3, ..., δn) is a matrix with spectral radius
less than 1. Then B22 = B
(1)
22 B
(2)
22 , ..., B
(n)
22 is a matrix with spectral ra-
dius less than 1. Therefore det(I −B22) 6= 0. This means the first column
of A(1)
c(1)(1)
is non-zero, and it must be identical to the bargaining outcome x∗.
Therefore the first player’s share is the (1, 1) element of A(1)
c(1)(1)
, which equals
det(I−B22)
c(1)(1)
= S(δ2,δ3,...,δn)
c(1)(1)
.
Recalling that the game is homogeneous, in the second period when
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player 2 is the leading player, the new bargaining matrix is given by B̃ =
QB2...BnB1Q
T .WhereQ =
[
0(n−1)×1 I(n−1)×(n−1)
1 01×(n−1)
]
,SinceB =
(
B1P
T
)
B̃
(
B1P
T
)−1
,
i.e., B̃ is similar to B, therefore B̃ and B share the same characteristic poly-
nomial, c
B̃
(λ) = cB (λ) . This implies their derivatives must be the same:
c′
B̃
(1) = c′B (1) = c
(1) (1) .
Finally notice that det
(
I − B̃22
)
= det
(
I −B(2)22 ...B
(n)
22 B
(1)
22
)
= S(δ3,
..., δn, δ1). We know that player 2’s share is
S(δ3,...,δn,δ1)
c(1)(1)
, if he were to
move first. This implies his share in the game where he moves second
would be x∗2 =
δ2S(δ3,...,δn,δ1)
c(1)(1)
, where δ2 is his discount factor. The same
reasoning implies that the share by player k would be written as x∗k =
δk−1k S(δk+1,...,δn,δ1,...,δk−1)
c(1)(1)
, completing the proof.
Up to now we have been assuming that the order of moves is exogenously
given in a fixed fashion. In the next section we relax this assumption by
allowing the order of moves to be random, and this random transition of the
right to make offers is governed by a Markov chain with transition matrix
P.
6 Multilateral Bargaining with Randomized Or-
der of Moves
In this section, the order of moves is allowed to be random. Suppose player
i is the player who makes an offer in period t. Once the offer is rejected, the
probability that player j makes another offer in period t+ 1 is given by pij .
Thus we obtain a transition matrix P = [pij ]n×n indicating the probability
of shifting the right to make an offer from player i to player j.
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Let
x·i =

x1i
x2i
...
xni
 ∈ ∆n
be an acceptable offer made by player i in period t + 1. Thus the matrix
X = [x·1, ..., x·n] indicates all the possible offers that would be made in
period t+ 1.
Now consider player i who is making an offer in period t. Given the
possible offer matrix in period t+ 1, the expected payoff in period t+ 1 for
all the players under the transition matrix P is given by
EPiX = XP
T
i ,
where Pi is the ith row of matrix P. Backward induction implies that player
i’s acceptable offer in period t would be
x·i = BiXP
T
i , i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Therefore the multilateral problem boils down to a solution to the above
system of equations.
Now we introduce the notion of vec-functions for a matrix. Let vec (X)
be the vector obtained by listing the columns of X above one another. Then
it is easily seen that
vec
(
BiXP
T
i
)
= Pi ⊗Bivec (X) .
This leads to the following system of equations,
x·i = Pi ⊗Bivec (X) , i = 1, 2, ..., n.
The following proposition characterizes the bargaining outcome with ran-
dom transition of moves.
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Proposition 5 The Markovian SPE outcome in the n-person bargaining
problem with random transition P is equivalent to finding a column stochas-
tic matrix X that satisfies the following system of equations:
x·1 = P1 ⊗B1vec (X) ,
x·2 = P2 ⊗B2vec (X) ,
....
x·n = Pn ⊗Bnvec (X) .
Denote
P ~B =

P1 ⊗B1
P2 ⊗B2
...
Pn ⊗Bn

n2×n2
as the block matrix. Then the above system of equations can be written as
vec (X) = [P ~B] vec (X) .
Thus the problem of finding the n-person bargaining outcome with random
transition is equivalent to finding a matrix X ∈ ∆n × · · · × ∆n such that
vec (X) = [P ~B] vec (X) .
We illustrate the above proposition with two examples.
Example 3: Two-person bargaining with random transition
probabilities.
The bargaining operators are B1 =
[
1 1− δ2
0 δ2
]
and B2 =
[
δ1 0
1− δ1 1
]
.
The transition matrix is P =
[
p11 p12
p21 p22
]
. Thus the equilibrium outcome
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matrix X =
[
x11 x12
x21 x22
]
is characterized by
[
x11
x21
]
=
[
1 1− δ2
0 δ2
] [
x11 x12
x21 x22
] [
p11
p12
]
,[
x12
x22
]
=
[
δ1 0
1− δ1 1
] [
x11 x12
x21 x22
] [
p21
p22
]
.
Solving the above equations with the condition that x·1, x·2 ∈ ∆2, we have
a unique solution:
X =
[
(1−δ2)(1−p22δ1)
1−δ1δ2+p11δ2(δ1−1)+p22δ1(δ2−1)
δ1(1−δ2)(1−p22)
1−δ1δ2+p11δ2(δ1−1)+p22δ1(δ2−1)
δ2(1−δ1)(1−p11)
1−δ1δ2+p11δ2(δ1−1)+p22δ1(δ2−1)
(1−δ1)(1−p11δ2)
1−δ1δ2+p11δ2(δ1−1)+p22δ1(δ2−1)
]
.
When players make alternative offers, meaning the transition is not random,
and letting p11 = p22 = 0, the transition matrix P reduces to
[
0 1
1 0
]
, and
we obtain the classical bargaining outcome of Rubinstein:
X =
[
x11 x12
x21 x22
]
=
[
(1−δ2)
1−δ1δ2
δ1(1−δ2)
1−δ1δ2
δ2(1−δ1)
1−δ1δ2
(1−δ1)
1−δ1δ2
]
.
Example 4: Three-person bargaining problem with identical
discount factor and random transition probabilities.
Here the bargaining operators are given by
B1 =
1 1− δ 1− δ0 δ 0
0 0 δ
 , B2 =
 δ 0 01− δ 1 1− δ
0 0 δ
 , B3 =
 δ 0 00 δ 0
1− δ 1− δ 1
 .
And
P =
p11 p12 p13p21 p22 p33
p31 p32 p33
 .
The equilibrium outcome boils down to
x·i = BiX
p11p12
p13
 , i = 1, 2, 3.
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We find that X = x11 x12 x13x21 x22 x23
x31 x32 x33

=

1−δ(p22+p33)+δ2(p22p33−p23p32)
D
δp21−δ2(p21p33−p31p23)
D
δp31−δ2(p22p31−p32p21)
D
δp12−δ2(p12p33−p13p32)
D
1−δ(p11+p33)+δ2(p11p33−p13p31)
D
δp32−δ2(p11p32−p12p31)
D
δp13−δ2(p13p22−p23p12)
D
δp23−δ2(p11p23−p21p13)
D
1−δ(p11+p22)+δ2(p11p22−p12p21)
D

where
D =
[
1 + δ (1− p11 − p22 − p33) + δ2 (1− p11 − p22 − p33)
+δ2 (p22p33 + p11p33 + p11p22 − p13p31 − p12p21 − p23p32)
]
.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the Rubinstein-Stahl model of bargaining with complete
information can be naturally generalized to n-person bargaining with het-
erogeneous discount factors. We introduce a bargaining operator for each
player and a bargaining operator for the game, which is a positive column
stochastic operator. We show that the effi cient outcome that can be sup-
ported by a stationary Markov strategy corresponds to the unique invariant
measure of the bargaining operator of the game, which is the fixed point of
the bargaining operator in the simplex. A closed form of this unique SPE is
provided. With this approach, we also characterize the effi cient stationary
outcome of multilateral bargaining with random transition matrix.
8 Appendix: The Perron-Frobenius Theorem
The following contains some results well known in matrix theory that we
have used in the derivation of our results in the paper:
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Let Rn be the n-dimensional Euclidean space, and Rn+, R
n
++ be defined
as usual.
Definition 1 i) A linear operator A : Rn → Rn is nonnegative if A leaves
Rn+ invariant, i.e., A(R
n
+) ⊂ Rn+.
ii) The linear operator A : Rn → Rn is positive if A(Rn+) ⊂ Rn++.
iii) A nonnegative matrix A = [aij ]n×n is column stochastic if
∑
i aij =
1.
iv) Nonnegative matrix A is primitive if there is k > 0 such that Ak is a
positive matrix.
v) A matrix A is irreducible, if it cannot be made into block upper-
diagonal by simultaneous permutation of rows and columns.
The following is the well known Perron and Frobenius Theorem which
is the finite dimensional version of Krein-Rutman Theorem.
Theorem 1 Let A be a nonnegative matrix. Denote its spectrum by σ(A).
Then:
i) The spectral radius |σ(A)| is an eigenvalue, that is, |σ(A)| ∈ σ(A),
and is associated with a nonnegative eigenvector x∗ ∈ Rn+.
ii) If, in addition, A is an irreducible matrix, then |σ(A)| ≥ |λ|, for
all λ ∈ σ(A), and |σ(A)| is a simple eigenvalue associated with a positive
eigenvector x∗ ∈ Rn++.
iii) If, in addition, A is a primitive matrix, then |σ(A)| > |λ| for all λ
∈ σ(A), λ 6= |σ (A) | .
A particular kind of nonnegative operator is the stochastic operator. The
next result is a direct application of the Perron-Frobenius Theorem.
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Theorem 2 Let A be a column stochastic operator. Then:
i) A leaves the simplex ∆n invariant.
ii) If A is primitive, then A has a largest eigenvalue λmax = 1, and all
the other eigenvalues |λ| < 1.
iii) When A is irreducible, it has a unique fixed point x∗ in the interior
of ∆n = {x| xi ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1}.
iv) When A is irreducible, xk = Akx converges to the unique fixed point
x∗ in ∆, for any given initial x ∈ ∆n.
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